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FOR WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE

WITH

DISCOVERY ORDER WILL BE AFFIRMED DESPITE SUBSEQUENT OFFER
OF COMPLIANCE.
"CLEAR"

APPLICABLE STANDARD

ABUSE OF DISCRETION-Mercer

OF APPELLATE REVIEW

IS

v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944

(Fla. 1983)
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are designed "to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."' Towards this end, the rules relating to discovery were promulgated in
order to end litigation by surprise and to assist all parties in trial
preparation.2 While most attorneys comply with the discovery
rules, there is occasional abuse. Perhaps the most frequent forms
of abuse are delaying tactics: failure to answer interrogatories, refusal to respond to requests to admit, and blatant disregard for
court orders. Such abuse not only makes litigation more burdensome and expensive, it also contributes to docket congestion.

To combat discovery abuse, both the federal and Florida rules of
civil procedure provide for a wide variety of sanctions which may
be used against a party who fails to comply with discovery procedure.3 Until recently, however, attorneys infrequently sought the
imposition of the harshest discovery sanctions of dismissal or default, and trial courts were reluctant to impose them. Then, even
when a trial judge did
sanction a litigant, Florida's appellate courts
4
would often reverse.
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court served notice that a trial
court's imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with the discovery rules should be upheld by appellate courts, absent a clear
showing of abuse of discretion. In Mercer v. Raine5 the supreme
court affirmed a trial court's decision to enter a default judgment
where it found the litigant's failure to comply with discovery to be

"willful." The court held that a delinquent party need not be given
a subsequent opportunity to comply with discovery nor must a
party moving for sanctions make a concrete showing of prejudice
occasioned by the noncompliance before a default could be en1. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280-.410.

3.

FED. R. Civ. P. 37; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380.
4. A review of the "Notes of Decisions" for FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380 in FLA. STAT. ANN.
(West Supp. 1983) reveals that trial courts' impositions of default or dismissal as sanctions
for discovery violations were reversed as frequently as they were affirmed. This note concentrates on the grounds given for appellate reversal and the legal viability of these grounds
following the decision in Mercer.
5. 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983).
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tered. Appellate reversal of the trial court could only be based on a
finding of clear abuse of discretion.6
Mercer provides an opportunity to review the Florida law of discovery sanctions and a chance to remind attorneys that abuse of
the discovery process need not be excused by the judiciary. This
note will first review the law in Florida before Mercer, and will
then set forth the procedural history of the case. Finally, it will
analyze the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court in Mercer in
order to determine the current standards important in the imposition of discovery sanctions.
I.

DISCOVERY SANCTIONS IN FLORIDA

Rule 1.380 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, "Failure to
Make Discovery, Sanctions," is virtually identical to its federal
counterpart, Rule 377 Though these rules are explicitly written,
they are difficult and confusing to read. This short summary is intended to identify the primary abuses which occur in the discovery
process and to consider the sanctions available against the abusing
party.
The first remedy available in the event of noncompliance with a
discovery request is a court order compelling the disobedient party
to respond. The trial court has discretion to either grant the motion or to issue such protective order as it deems necessary. If the
motion is granted then "the court shall require the party . . .
whose conduct necessitated the motion" to pay the other party's
"reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order that may include attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to
the motion was justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust."
In the event that a party fails to obey a court order compelling
discovery, there are a number of sanctions that may be imposed.
These sanctions are: taking designated facts to be established,
prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing certain matters
into evidence, striking the pleadings, dismissing the action, entering a default judgment, and entering an order of contempt of
court. The court is also authorized to require the payment of rea6. Id. at 945-46.
7. Any differences between the two rules reflect a preference for style and language more
than any substantive distinction.
8. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a) (emphasis added).
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sonable expenses, including attorney's fees.' The rule provides that
all of these sanctions (except for contempt) may be imposed for
the failure of a party either to attend his own deposition, serve
answers or objections to interrogatories, or serve a proper written
response to a request for inspection. For these acts an order to
compel need not be entered, and a party may be sanctioned even if
noncompliance was inadvertent. 10
9.

FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b):

Failure to Comply With Order.
(1) If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed
to do so by the court, the failure may be considered a contempt of the court.
(2) If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rule 1.310(b)(6) or 1.320(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails
to obey an order to provide or permit discovery including an order made under
subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 1.360, the court in which the action is pending
may make any of the following orders:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the
order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts of them or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part of it, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) Instead of any of the foregoing orders or in addition to them, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except
an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) When a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 1.360(a)
requiring him to produce another for examination, the orders listed in
paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to
comply shows that he is unable to produce the person for examination.
(F) Instead of any of the foregoing orders or in addition to them, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order to pay the reasonable
expenses caused by the failure that may include attorney's fees, unless the
court finds that the failure was justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
10. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(d):
Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve Answers to Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection.
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 1.310(b)(6) or 1.320(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to
appear before the officer who is to take his deposition after being served with a
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted
under Rule 1.340 after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 1.350 after proper
service of the request. The court in which the action is pending may take any
action authorized under paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule. Instead of any order or in addition to it, the court shall require the party
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GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL

All of the sanctions available under Rule 1.380 are discretionary
with the trial judge, but the limits to this discretion are in dispute.
Appellate courts in Florida have frequently reversed a trial court's
entry of dismissal or default, limiting the effectiveness of these
sanctions. These courts have cited five primary grounds for their
reversals.
By far the most frequent ground for reversal is the appellate
court's determination that the sanctioned party's noncompliance
did not constitute "willful disregard" of judicial authority. The rationale for such a requirement was summed up by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Herold v. Computer Components International, Inc.," where the court said:
The sanctions provided under this rule, particularly the striking

of pleadings and dismissal of a cause should be imposed only in
the exceptional case. .

.

. There have been indications that the

exceptional case is where the recalcitrant party has acted in wilful
disregard of or with gross indifference to an order of the court
requiring discovery with such deliberate callousness or negligence
as to occasion an inability to comply with the court's order. 2
Absent an explicit finding by a trial judge that noncompliance with
a discovery order was willful, an appellate court will almost certainly reverse the entry of default or dismissal. 3 There have been
cases, however, where an appellate court simply disagreed with a
trial court's finding of willfulness. 4
failing to act to pay the reasonable expenses caused by the failure that may include attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the failure was justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the discovery
sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective
order as provided by Rule 1.280(c).
11. 252 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
12. Id. at 579. The court here was reviewing federal cases interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 37,
the counterpart to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380. The court adopted the federal analysis.
13. See Santuoso v. McGrath & Assocs., Inc., 385 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Reliance Builders, Inc. v. City of Coral Springs, 373 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Ramos
v. Sanchez, 375 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Turner v. Anderson, 376 So. 2d 899, 901
(Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lewis, 260 So. 2d 221, 226 (Fla. Ist DCA 1972).
Federal appellate courts will also reverse a district court's imposition of dismissal or default
as a sanction if there is no explicit finding of willfulness. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1970).
14. E.g., Beaver Crane Serv., Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 373 So. 2d 88, 89 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979); Trustee of Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Sailboat Apt. Corp., 323 So.
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A second ground for reversing a trial court's imposition of sanctions was that the moving party had demonstrated no prejudice
resulting from noncompliance. Without such a showing, the general rule was that a sanction of dismissal or default was too harsh
and therefore an abuse of discretion." The Florida courts which
reversed sanctions, in part because the moving party had shown no
prejudice, were probably following the lead of some federal courts.
In Rogers v. Chicago Park District,6 a federal district court discussed the rationale for such a requirement:
The proper sanction under Rule 37(b) for a party's failure to obey
a court order regarding discovery should be no more severe than
Thus,
is necessary to prevent prejudice to the other party ....
the extent to which one party's failure to produce documents impairs the other party's ability to prosecute or defend should be
the focus of any attempt to frame sanctions under this rule.1"
Third, Florida appellate courts have reversed trial judges who
did not provide a subsequent opportunity for the delinquent party
to comply with discovery before imposing sanctions. Although Rule
1.380 authorizes dismissal of an action for a party's first-time noncompliance with discovery, three of Florida's district courts of appeal have held that such dismissal would constitute abuse of discretion in these cases. 8 The leading Florida case on this point is
Hurley v. Werly, 9 where the Second District Court discussed the
underlying purpose of Rule 1.380:
It is not penal. It is not punitive. It is not aimed at punishment of
the litigant. The objective is compliance-compliance with the
discovery Rules. The sanctions are set up as a means to an end,
not the end itself. The end is compliance. The sanctions should
2d 654, 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
15. This factor played a role in the following appellate decisions which reversed trial
courts' impositions of sanctions: Beaver Crane Serv., 373 So. 2d at 89; W.G.C., Inc. v. Man
Co., 360 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 357 So. 2d
464, 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
16. 89 F.R.D. 716, 718-19 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
17. Id. at 718 (citations omitted). Other federal courts have also declared that the moving party must show prejudice before harsh discovery sanctions may be imposed. See, e.g.,
Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 996 (8th Cir. 1975); General Atomic Co.
v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
18. See Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Hurley v. Werly,
203 So. 2d 530, 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Hyman v. Schwartz, 177 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1965); State Rd. Dept. v. Hufford, 161 So. 2d 35, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).
19. 203 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967).
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be invoked only in flagrant cases, certainly in no less than aggravated cases, and then only after the Court has given the defaulting party a reasonable opportunity to conform after originally
failing or even refusing to appear."0
Fourth, several appellate courts have held that a trial court may
not enter a dismissal or default without first entering an order to
compel, despite the provisions of the rule that indicate otherwise.2 1
The belief seems to be that a party should first seek a motion to
compel discovery before seeking sanctions.2 2 In one case, a party
was not allowed to introduce evidence as a sanction for failure to
answer interrogatories, although no motion to compel had been
filed or entered. 3 In a special concurring opinion, one judge
stressed that "the bar needs to be put on notice that this court
intends to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure as they are
written, which intention constitutes a departure to some extent
2' 4
from tradition.
One important consideration for appellate courts when the sanction of dismissal or default is involved is whether due process or
access to the courts has been denied to the disobedient party. After all, it is a fundamental proposition that "there is a strong public policy favoring a trial on the merits and against depriving a
party of his day in court."2 6 This is particularly true in Florida in
light of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which
reads: "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury." Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court pointed
out in the leading case on discovery sanctions, the provisions of the
sanctions rule must be read in light of due process requirements. 6
The Court made clear in the same case, however, that willful abuse
20. Id. at 537.
21. See Reliance Builders, 373 So. 2d at 411; Hyman, 177 So. 2d at 752; Remington
Constr. Co. v. Hamilton Elec., Inc., 181 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Hufford, 161 So.
2d at 40.
22. For instance, in Hyman the court said, "It is our view that ... the defendant herein
should have been given a fixed time in which to more fully reply to the interrogatories in
question and that upon failure to do so the court could then properly strike the pleadings."
177 So. 2d at 752.
23. Fearns v. Fearns, 336 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
24. Id. (Downey, J., concurring).
25. Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 996 (8th Cir. 1975). For Florida
cases expressing the same proposition, see W.G.C., Inc. v. Man Co., 360 So. 2d 1152, 1153
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Clark v. Suncoast Peach Corp., 263 So. 2d. 247, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA
1972).
26. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958).

DISCOVERY SANCTIONS

1984]

of the discovery process justified dismissal or default, and such
sanction would not offend due process.2 7
Fifth, trial courts in Florida have also been reversed because appellate courts believed that the sanctions had been imposed for the
wrong reason, holding that the severity of the sanctions must be
commensurate with the violation. 8 Sanctions which punish the
"litigant rather than the attorney" should not be imposed if noncompliance was the result of counsel's mistake. A less severe sanction is more appropriate in such cases.2 9 If noncompliance with a
discovery request is the result of the litigant's conduct, however,
then the harshest sanction may be imposed.3"
While appellate courts in Florida frequently seem to delight in
reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Florida Supreme
Court has not shared this enthusiasm. That court has repeatedly
held, in no uncertain terms, that the discretionary acts of the trial
court should not be reversed on appeal absent a finding of abuse of
discretion-meaning misinterpretation of the facts and applicable
law by the trial judge." It was this standard of review in the context of discovery sanctions which was emphatically affirmed by the
court in Mercer v. Raine.
III.

THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Mercer v. Raine

On September 14, 1979 the plaintiff, Raine, served the defendant, Mercer, with the complaint along with the first request to
produce. The complaint alleged breach of contract, promissory estoppel and fraud stemming from the proposed sale of the Galt
27. Id. at 210. The case, however, is most often cited for the following proposition: "[W]e
think that Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because
of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established
that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any
fault of petitioner." Id. at 212.
28. E.g., Hart v. Weaver, 364 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
29. Goldman v. Tabor, 239 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). See also Beasley v. Girten, 61
So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1952); Flanzbaum v. Stans Lounge, 377 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
("[A]ny failure to comply was due more to the withdrawal of counsel and appellants' subsequent difficulties in securing representation than to appellants' deliberate refusal to
comply.").
30. Such was the case in Mercer, as shall be seen in the procedural history, see infra
notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Baptist Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bell, 384 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1980) (power
to grant or deny a new trial is discretionary with trial judge); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382
So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) (trial judge is vested with great discretion to do equity between
the parties in a divorce action); Farish v. Lum's Inc., 267 So. 2d 325, 328 (Fla. 1972) (trial
court held material facts admitted because of failure to comply with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.370
regarding form of responses and granted summary judgment).

196

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:189

Ocean Mile Hotel on Miami Beach. Raine sent the first set of interrogatories ten days later. Mercer responded by filing a motion to
dismiss, along with a motion for extension of time to produce and
to respond to requests for admissions. He objected to the interrogatories on the theory that he should not be forced to respond until
after a hearing on the motion to dismiss.32
The trial court heard oral arguments on the motion to dismiss
on November 6. On November 27 the court entered an order denying Mercer's motion to dismiss and directing compliance with all
discovery within twenty days. On December 6 Mercer filed his answer, as well as his affirmative defenses to the complaint. He did
not, however, respond to discovery, so on December 26 Raine filed
a motion to strike Mercer's affirmative defenses. Mercer still failed
to respond to discovery, and Raine moved the court to enter a default judgment as a sanction.33 In his motion Raine pointed out
that four months had passed since discovery had first been sought.
He alleged that he had "been damaged by this delay in the preparation and prosecution of [his] case," which increased his expenses
and deprived him of the benefits of his attorney's efforts to discover necessary information." '
On January 11, 1980, Mercer's counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the litigation. 5 In this motion the attorney alleged a
deliberate disregard of fee arrangements, as well as "[tlhat defendant, by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for his
counsel to carry out their employment effectively." ' 6 The trial
judge consolidated the motion for sanctions with the motion to
withdraw and set a hearing.
Mercer neglected to attend this hearing. Asked why Mercer was
not present at the hearing, the attorney introduced a copy of the
letter he had sent to Mercer informing him that he was withdrawing, advising him of the severe nature of the sanctions sought, and
suggesting that Mercer immediately obtain other counsel to represent him.3 7 Counsel was also asked the reasons for his with32. Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 945 (Fla. 1983).
33. Id.
34. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 1.380 (Jan. 14, 1980), in Appendix to
Brief of the Petitioner on the Merits, at 46 [hereinafter cited as Appendix].
35. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 945.
36. Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Defendant (Jan. 11, 1980), in Appendix, supra
note 34, at 42. Both nonpayment of fees and conduct by the litigant rendering representation unreasonably difficult are grounds for withdrawal according to FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

37.

DR 2-110(C)(1)(d) and (F).

Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Withdraw (Feb. 7,
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drawal. Apart from the dispute over fees, counsel testified that
Mercer had made no effort to contact him about discovery and had
failed to keep an appointment set up for that purpose. 8 Based on
this testimony the court made the following findings of fact:
Defendant ... has failed to comply with the Order of this Court
requiring response to discovery even by the date of this hearing
on this motion. This Court, therefore, finds that Defendant was
aware of the deadline imposed by the Court's Order of November
27, 1979, but chose to disregard that portion relating to discovery.
The Court further finds, after inquiring of Counsel withdrawing
herein, that the Defendant, Mercer, was well aware of the hearing
on this Motion for Sanctions and the consequences of same . . .
and Defendant has failed to appear or be represented at this
hearing. It is further noted that Defendant has not only failed to
appear but has also failed to communicate with this Court concerning his inability to appear."
Therefore, the court struck Mercer's answer, entered a default
judgment against him on the issue of liability, and ordered him to
pay Raine's costs and attorney's fees occasioned by his refusal to
comply with the court order.4 0
Following imposition of sanctions, Mercer obtained new counsel
and complied with all discovery requests within six days.4 ' Mercer
also filed a motion for a rehearing to which he attached an affidavit
which attempted to explain his noncompliance. The motion for rehearing alleged, "No serious prejudice could have been suffered by
the Plaintiffs. The Defendant is still here, the hotel is still here
and nothing has happened which would have otherwise prejudiced
Plaintiffs' rights. '42 In the attached affidavit Mercer claimed that
he was only in Fort Lauderdale three days a week, spending the
remainder of his time in Philadelphia. 43 Mercer said he was advised by his former counsel "that there was no cause for alarm,
1980), in Appendix, supra note 34, at 71.
38. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Withdraw (Feb. 7,
1980), in Appendix, supra note 34, at 58-59.
39. Order Granting Sanctions Under Rule 1.380 (Feb. 7, 1980), in Appendix, supra note
34, at 75-76.
40. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 945.
41. Defendant's Motion for Rehearing and/or Motion to Set Aside and Vacate the
Court's Order of February 7, 1980, With Attached Affidavit (Feb. 13, 1980), in Appendix,
supra note 34, at 94.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Affidavit (Feb. 13, 1980), in Appendix, supra note 34, at 97.
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that he could not imagine the Court not allowing five to ten or
even twenty days for him to obtain new counsel and to provide the
information which the Plaintiffs were seeking." Mercer said that
he had been unable to obtain an attorney to represent him at the
hearing on sanctions and had not believed that it was necessary for
him to make an appearance. Mercer concluded by stating: "He at
no time willfully failed to comply with orders of this Court compelling discovery or to otherwise obstruct the Plaintiffs in obtaining
proper discovery [sic]." 44
The trial judge denied the motion for rehearing, and it was this
order which Mercer appealed to the Fourth District Court. In a
surprisingly brief per curiam opinion, the trial court's imposition
of sanctions was affirmed:
The decision to impose sanctions for a discovery violation and the
severity thereof are matters within the discretion of the trial
judge. Absent clear abuse these discretionary acts will not be reversed on appeal ....
We conclude that appellant has failed to
make such a demonstration in this case and the order below is
thus affirmed.4
A dissent was filed by Judge Hurley who stressed that this was
"the first time the defendant was brought before the court for the
imposition of sanctions.""" Judge Hurley also thought it important
that Mercer had been involved in a fee dispute with his counsel
and that he had fully complied with discovery six days after the
default was entered. Though he agreed with the majority that a
trial judge should not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse
of discretion, he believed that the sanctions in this case amounted
to "overkill. 47 Hurley cited the case of Santuoso v. McGrath &
Associates48 as controlling:
The severity of a sanction must be commensurate with the violation, and should be imposed upon a defendant only in extreme
situations for flagrant or aggravated cases of disobedience. The
visitation of such an ultimate sanction should not be imposed for
failure to timely comply with a discovery order especially where
failure to comply does not operate to prejudice the opposing
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Mercer v. Raine, 410 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (citation omitted).
Id. at 932 (Hurley, J., dissenting).
Id.
385 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

DISCOVERY SANCTIONS

19841

party in any substantial manner."9
The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mercer based on
this perceived direct conflict.5 0
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN

Mercer

Mercer's primary argument was that the trial court had abused
its discretion by entering a default "without affording the defendant an opportunity to cure the violation by compliance and in the
absence of a finding by the court that the noncompliance was willful or that plaintiffs suffered any undue prejudice. 5 1 Mercer also
argued that the sanctions in this case violated due process because
they were imposed merely to punish and because Mercer was unrepresented by counsel at the time the sanctions were entered. 2
Instead of addressing these arguments, however, Justice Adkins,
writing for a six justice majority, discussed the rationale underlying the grant of discretionary power to the trial judge and the applicable standard of appellate review. According to Adkins, the exercise of discretion by a trial judge "is essential to the just and
proper application of procedural rules"5 3 because "it is impossible
to establish rules for every possible sequence of events and types of
violations that may ensue in the discovery process." 5' A trial judge
is given this discretionary power because of his "superior vantage
point" in that he has a firsthand opportunity to judge the conduct
of the litigants before him.55
In reviewing the decision of a trial court to impose sanctions, the
court held, only clear abuse of discretion will justify reversal by the
appellate courts. Abuse of discretion means that the trial court
"clearly erred in its interpretation of the facts and the use of its
judgment" or in its application of the law. Put another way, the
49. Mercer, 410 So. 2d at 932 (Hurley, J., dissenting) (quoting Santuoso, 385 So. 2d at
113).
50. It is somewhat difficult to understand why the court decided to exercise discretionary review in this case. After all, the Fourth District Court of Appeal had affirmed the trial
court's decision, and at first glance it seems that the supreme court affirmed both decisions
that were supposedly in conflict. It is this author's position that jurisdiction was taken so
that the court could deliver its views on the scope of discovery sanctions, as they were dissatisfied with the frequent reversals of trial courts as evidenced by decisions like Santuoso.
51. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 945.
52. Brief of the Petitioner on the Merits at 26-32.
53. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 945 (quoting Farish v. Lum's, Inc., 267 So. 2d 325, 328 (Fla.
1972)).
54. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 945.
55. Id. (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)).
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test of reasonableness is the standard to be used in determining
whether a trial court abused its discretion: "If reasonable men
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial
court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no
finding of an abuse of discretion.""6
The court then discussed the particular standards a trial judge
should use in determining whether to impose sanctions. The severe
sanctions of dismissal or default, said the court, were justified only
deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authorby "a
57
ity"

or by "bad faith, willful disregard or gross indifference to an

order of the court, or conduct which evinces deliberate callousness." 58 Though the trial judge in Mercer had not explicitly stated
that the noncompliance by Mercer was willful, his finding that the
"defendant 'knew what was going on' and had 'total disregard for
support an interpretation that his
the consequences' . . . would
59
noncompliance was willful."

The supreme court therefore implicitly overruled the appellate
decisions which had held that the record must be "clear" that noncompliance was willful before a sanction of dismissal or default
could be justified. Though the court distinguished Santuoso on the
ground that the trial court in that case had not made an explicit
finding of willful noncompliance, it is clear that the decision of the
Third District Court of Appeal was disapproved. This conclusion
follows from the fact that while the court in Santuoso held that
the record must be clear that noncompliance was willful and had
also stressed that prejudice to the moving party must be shown,
the supreme court did not find these factors to be controlling.
Furthermore, the court held that a trial court's failure to grant a
subsequent opportunity to comply with discovery is not grounds
for appellate reversal, nor should reversal be predicated on the
grounds that no concrete showing of prejudice was made by the
party moving for sanctions. (The court disagreed with appellant's
arguments on these points.)60 Mercer's after-the-fact compliance
with discovery was irrelevant because he had already had his second chance to comply with the rules. If litigants were always given
56. Id.
57. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 946 (citing Swindle v. Reid, 242 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA
1970)).
58. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 946 (citing Herold v. Computer Components Int'l, Inc., 252 So.
2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)).
59. Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 946.
60. Id. at 945.
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"one more chance" to comply, then the sanction of Rule 1.380
would be rendered meaningless.
Every delay in discovery undoubtedly prejudices the other party,
but it is the rare case where a litigant could conclusively demonstrate that delay has operated to prejudice him in a meaningful
way. Such a case would likely be a declaratory action or a criminal
prosecution where delay in the course of the trial would adversely
affect the rights of one party while proving advantageous to the
other. More frequently, though, in the general civil action, a litigant may wish to delay payment of a judgment in order to control
a sum of money for a longer period of time. In Mercer, plaintiff's
counsel strenuously argued that Mercer was deliberately engaging
in delaying tactics in order to achieve this result. The supreme
court has implicitly held that a litigant should not be allowed to
abuse the judicial process and then escape consequences because
the opposing party is unable to make a concrete showing of
prejudice.
What emerges from Mercer is that the sanctions provided for by
Rule 1.380 may be used to punish a litigant who willfully abuses
the discovery process. The purpose of such punishment is twofold:
first, to maintain the integrity of the courts by providing a trial
judge with effective tools to control the progress of litigation, and,
second, to deter those who might be tempted to ignore discovery
requests and orders. Thus, the old rationale enunciated by Hurley
v.Werlye' has been set aside in favor of this new idea. This shift in
emphasis, from compliance to punishment and deterrence, has
been wrought because of the continuing abuse of the discovery process, the frequent reversals of trial judges by the appellate courts,
and the lingering problem of docket congestion. 2
In light of this changing rationale it is disappointing that the
court did not address the competing policy interests of ensuring
that due process is provided and that every case is litigated on the
merits. Mercer would have been an appropriate case in which to
discuss these competing interests, particularly in view of the
61. 203 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
62. For a good general overview of the deterrence rationale in federal courts, see Note,
The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 1033 (1978). This note argues that the case of National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam) (a case cited as persuasive by the
Florida Supreme Court in Mercer), signaled that "general deterrence is a permissible, and
perhaps even mandatory, goal under rule 37." Note, supra, at 1047.
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amount in controversy" and the fact that Mercer was unrepresented by counsel at the time the sanctions were imposed. Although the discretionary rulings of the trial judge should generally
be affirmed, the requirements of due process do impose limitations
on that discretion. These limitations are best addressed by the supreme court, which is possessed with a clearer vision of the needs
of litigants throughout the state. Likewise, in light of the general
reluctance of trial courts to impose the harshest of sanctions, it
would have been appropriate for the supreme court to address access to the court concerns and explain the justification for the imposition of discovery sanctions. Instead, these arguments are left to
be made by future litigants and resolved by appellate courts.

V.

APPELLATE APPLICATION OF

Mercer

The Fourth District Court of Appeal has commented on the
scope of the Mercer decision in two recent opinions. In Florida
Physicians Insurance Reciprocal v. Baliton," the court affirmed
the trial court's finding of bad faith in failing to make discovery on
the basis of Mercer. The court reversed the trial judge's imposition
of a $150,000 fine as a sanction, however, holding that Rule 1.380
did not authorize fines except when a party is found in contempt
of court. 6 5 In Cem-A-Care, Inc. v. Automated Planning Systems,
Inc.,6 the defendant obtained a continuance. The trial court found
that those actions were a "flagrant, persistent, aggravated and willful attempt to delay and avoid the trial of the case," and struck
the defendant's pleadings. 67 The court of appeal affirmed on the
basis of Mercer, holding: "When a trial judge expressly finds that a
party has willfully and flagrantly abused the system and violated
court orders, then the severity of the sanction is within the very
broad discretionary area [of the trial court]." 6 8 The court gave no
citation to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which is just as
well since no rule authorizes the striking of defensive pleadings as
a sanction for noncompliance with a trial court's order not concerned with discovery.
Thus, initially, Mercer appears to be receiving an expansive in63. The case was characterized as a "multimillion dollar" one by Mercer's attorney, Mr.
Finkle. Transcript of Hearing (Feb. 7, 1980), in Appendix, supra note 34, at 54.
64. 436 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
65. Id. at 1112.
66. 442 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
67. Id. at 1049.
68. Id.
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terpretation by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and other appellate courts in Florida should follow. The real impact of Mercer
is that the discretionary acts of the trial judge, especially with respect to sanctions, are not subject to appellate reversal in most
cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's authority to impose discovery sanctions has
been emphatically affirmed by the supreme court's decision in
Mercer. The only limitation upon that authority is that the litigant's noncompliance must be found to be willful or flagrant before
the ultimate sanctions of dismissal or default can be imposed. The
other grounds traditionally relied upon by Florida appellate courts
for reversal of trial courts are no longer legally viable. If the recent
appellate decisions are any evidence, then the Mercer decision will
be given an expansive interpretation and a trial court's discretionary rulings will be affirmed. This decision should prompt tardy litigants and attorneys to end abuse of the discovery process once the
possible consequences are clearly realized. If so, Mercer will rank
as an important statement by the Florida Supreme Court which
will provide persuasive authority in future years.
ADAM TEBRUGGE

